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Abstract—The wide-spread adoption of system defenses such
as the randomization of code, stack, and heap raises the bar
for code-reuse attacks. Thus, attackers utilize a scripting engine
in target programs like a web browser to prepare the code-
reuse chain, e.g., relocate gadget addresses or perform a just-
in-time gadget search. However, many types of programs do
not provide such an execution context that an attacker can use.
Recent advances in data-oriented programming (DOP) explored
an orthogonal way to abuse memory corruption vulnerabilities
and demonstrated that an attacker can achieve Turing-complete
computations without modifying code pointers in applications.
As of now, constructing DOP exploits requires a lot of manual
work—for every combination of application and payload anew.
In this paper, we present novel techniques to automate the
process of generating DOP exploits. We implemented a compiler
called STEROIDS that leverages these techniques and compiles
our high-level language SLANG into low-level DOP data struc-
tures driving malicious computations at run time. This enables an
attacker to specify her intent in an application- and vulnerability-
independent manner to maximize reusability. We demonstrate the
effectiveness of our techniques and prototype implementation by
specifying four programs of varying complexity in SLANG that
calculate the Levenshtein distance, traverse a pointer chain to
steal a private key, relocate a ROP chain, and perform a JIT-
ROP attack. STEROIDS compiles each of those programs to low-
level DOP data structures targeted at five different applications
including GStreamer, Wireshark, and ProFTPd, which have
vastly different vulnerabilities and DOP instances. Ultimately,
this shows that our compiler is versatile, can be used for both 32-
bit and 64-bit applications, works across bug classes, and enables
highly expressive attacks without conventional code-injection or
code-reuse techniques in applications lacking a scripting engine.
Index Terms—Data-Oriented Programming, Exploitation,
Compiler, Steroids, Slang
I. INTRODUCTION
Attackers have to overcome more and more obstacles to
exploit an application given that defense mechanisms such
as stack protections, data-execution prevention (DEP), address
space layout randomization (ASLR) and control-flow integrity
(CFI) [1]–[3] are nowadays widely deployed. Modern defenses
often require that an attacker adapts her exploit to the current
state of the application she is attacking. For this reason, many
modern exploits target browsers or PDF readers, which come
with a built-in scripting engine. Utilizing the computational
capabilities of these scripting engines, e. g., JavaScript or
Flash, the attacker can repeatedly leverage a memory error,
probe memory, find gadgets just-in-time, and perform complex
computations to make the code-reuse chain compatible to the
target application’s security model. However, system defenses
like execute-only memory (XOM) and its relatives [4]–[7],
CPI [8] and Readactor [9], [10] aim to mitigate even advanced
just-in-time code-reuse attacks.
An alternative line of attacks targets non-control data [11].
These so-called data-oriented attacks (DOAs) can have con-
sequences just as severe as code-reuse attacks, but neither
alter code pointers nor rely on the present code randomiza-
tion. Despite DOAs being less well-explored than code-reuse
attacks, there have been efforts to ensure data integrity [12]–
[19]. Nevertheless, efficient mitigation of DOAs with strong
security guarantees remains a challenging and open problem.
Data-oriented programming (DOP) is an extension of DOA,
which manipulates non-control data to use the application’s
own operations to perform arbitrary computations of the at-
tacker’s choice. Thus, they could provide the execution context
modern code-reuse methods need, even in applications which
lack a scripting engine. We dub this a bring your own scripting
engine (BYOSE) attack, which is more versatile and potentially
even more harmful than DOAs alone, and arguably makes
securing data flow an even more pressing topic.
The state of the art in DOP is mostly concerned with
searching for DOP gadgets [20] or considers rather simple
programs [21]. However, using DOP gadgets for non-trivial
DOP programs is left to manual work, as the resulting exploits
are highly application- and vulnerability-dependent. While
existing work showed that diverse and powerful DOP gadgets
are available, it is unclear which DOP gadgets are actually
necessary or can be expressed through others, or which
minimal sets of DOP gadgets achieve useful expressiveness
in different DOP attack modes.
In this paper, we close this gap: we provide novel insights
into the flexibility of DOP, introduce a high degree of automa-
tion for the construction of DOP exploits, and demonstrate that
complex attack payloads work across different applications
and vulnerabilities. More specifically, we present a high-level
programming language called SLANG, which can be used
to describe DOP programs. Using descriptions of the DOP
gadgets available from a specific vulnerability of a specific
application (conceptually, the output of the gadget search [20],
[22]), we use an automated way to craft the data structures that
trigger DOP gadgets to carry out the computation described
in the DOP program. Since the SLANG scripts are designed
to be application-independent, the available DOP gadgets
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usually do not immediately yield all necessary operations
to express the attacker’s intent. To tackle this problem, we
support and encode recipes for various operations, i. e., ways to
combine them to express either one another or more high-level
operations. Implicitly, this creates a graph structure, which we
call an Operations Graph (Op-Graph). Given such an Op-
Graph, we translate the attacker’s script to use only DOP
gadgets present in the target application. As such, most of the
manual effort to create a DOP program for one application
can be reused to exploit other vulnerabilities or applications
with different sets of DOP gadgets.
To demonstrate the practicality of our techniques, we
implemented our approach in a tool called STEROIDS. It
can automatically build different DOP programs for different
applications with different defense mechanisms. E. g., one of
our scripts expects to be run on a randomized binary [23],
and searches gadgets at runtime to ultimately mount a just-in-
time code-reuse attack. This effectively bypasses the protection
offered by, say, Binary Stirring [24] or Compiler-assisted Code
Randomization [25]. One key element is that the attacker’s
script does not have to be modified to be compiled for
different vulnerabilities or different applications. Furthermore,
our experiments include examples to highlight various features
of our compiler, namely (i) to bootstrap additional DOP
gadgets, (ii) to compile to branch-free code to compensate for
lacking conditional jumps, and (iii) to support an interactive
mode if only a single DOP gadget can be executed at a time.
Ultimately, our results show that DOP is not esoteric, but
can indeed be utilized to reliably execute complex attack
payloads in target programs. These BYOSE attacks transfer
the possibility of advanced code-reuse attacks, such as JIT-
ROP, to target applications without a built-in scripting engine.
In summary, our main contributions are as follows:
• We provide novel insights regarding the minimal require-
ments for successful DOP exploitation. We can push
the boundaries by bootstrapping new DOP instructions,
utilizing branch-free code and an interactive mode.
• We develop novel techniques to automate the construction
of DOP programs and enable the reuse of exploits across
target applications and vulnerabilities.
• We present our prototype implementation STEROIDS,
which can compile exploits specified in our high-level
scripting language SLANG for a given target application.
• We demonstrate the practicality of our techniques
and prototype by implementing complex programs in
SLANG and automatically compiling them to DOP pro-
grams in binary form. Our SLANG scripts include ROP
chain relocation and a runtime gadget search. We show
that BYOSE enables just-in-time code-reuse attacks for
applications without a built-in scripting engine and thus,
extends the set of potential targets.
II. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
Before diving into the details of our approach, we briefly
introduce the necessary technical background information on
data-oriented programming needed to understand the building
blocks of our method.
Code-reuse attacks. The motivation for return-to-libc at-
tacks [26], return-oriented programming (ROP) [27] and its
variants [28]–[31] was the wide-spread adoption of the W⊕X
policy, which prohibits the execution of writable data sections
rendering code injection infeasible. These so called code-
reuse attacks have in common that they reuse pieces of
existing code, which are called ROP gadgets, and employ a
mechanism to chain these gadgets by creating or modifying
code pointers. Code-randomization defenses [24], [32]–[38]
shuffle and modify gadgets, forcing attackers to relocate their
ROP chain or even search new gadgets to construct a new
ROP chain on the fly (JIT-ROP [39], [40]). To mitigate just-
in-time code-reuse attacks, many defenses have been proposed
that hide code and code pointers [7], [9], [10], [41]–[43] or
aim to preserve the control flow [1]–[3], [8], [44].
Data-only attacks. Leveraging memory corruptions to modify
non-control data is an orthogonal attack vector [11], [22],
[45]. The attacker corrupts data structures or data pointers to
modify the data flow. In this way, the program’s logic can be
tricked into leaking sensitive information like private keys [22]
or passing attacker-controlled content to access control data
structures or critical functions such as execve. The existing
efforts to prevent DOAs [12]–[19] impose a high performance
overhead or do not provide strong security guarantees.
Data-oriented programming. Similar to ROP, DOP aims
to achieve a high degree of expressiveness, but without
modifying code pointers. The attacker utilizes a memory
corruption vulnerability to modify existing data structures or
to inject new data structures. The ultimate goal of DOP is to
repurpose the logic of existing pieces of code (DOP gadgets)
to perform the attacker desired computation (DOP operations).
However, arbitrarily chaining of gadgets spread across the
program, as is possible with ROP, is not possible for DOP.
A certain proximity in the control-flow graph is required to
ensure continuous execution and selection of the next DOP
gadget. Conceptually, two methods to chain DOP gadgets
exist: First, the non-interactive mode utilizes an existing loop
in the program with DOP gadgets in its loop body to ensure
continuous execution. Additionally, a mechanism is necessary
that selects the next data structure like a linked list or an array
of structs. Often the loop condition needs to be modified
to keep the loop running, which can be accomplished with
the memory corruption or the execution of the first DOP
gadget. Since the payload contains the trigger for the memory
corruption and the data for all instructions, the attacker needs
no further interaction with the target application. Second, in
the interactive mode, the attacker initiates the loop iterations
separately by repeatedly leveraging the memory corruption
and feeding the data structures that trigger the desired DOP
gadgets. The motivation for this mode is that the attacker
may not be able to extract state of the target program, e.g.,
if the memory corruption has no read capabilities. In this
case adapting a code-reuse payload on the attacker side is
severely hampered. That being said, if the attacker can extract
state, she can adapt following DOP gadgets for an even more
efficient adaptive interactive mode. For the remainder of the
paper, we will assume that this is not the case, though.
We define the following three steps to launch a DOP attack:
Gadget search: Find DOP gadgets that are reachable directly
or indirectly by the memory corruption vulnerability. The
scope depends on the bug, but can range from structures
on the active stack frame to the whole program. Fur-
thermore, the outputs of DOP gadgets must be readable
by the following DOP gadgets. This step also involves
searching gadget dispatcher loops or establish an outside
mechanism to chain gadgets.
DOP instance setup: Collect path constraints to reach the
basic blocks containing DOP gadgets and setup data
structure templates that trigger desired DOP gadgets. In
the non-interactive mode, one also needs to setup the
mechanism that feeds the required data structures and
triggers the next cycle.
Payload preparation: The native gadgets of the DOP in-
stance often provide constrained and unusual operations.
For example, some DOP instances lack a controllable
program counter, conditional operations, or even basic
arithmetic and data movement. Thus, this step involves
bootstrapping a convenient set of operations and creating
a stream of operations that compensates lacking features.
Finally, the collection of data structure contents and
inputs for the memory corruption must be compiled.
Previous work [20] focused on the automation of the gadget
search. While they also performed DOP instance setup and
payload preparation, they did so in a mostly manual fashion. In
contrast, Block-Oriented Programming [21] provides a higher
degree of automation, but its program synthesis is NP-hard.
Thus, it can mainly solve the constraints for DOP programs
that are not too complex, and rather belongs to the step of
DOP instance setup.
In this paper, we pursue orthogonal research by focusing
on automating the payload preparation. We leave the gadget
search to related work and interface the DOP instance setup.
That is, we define a file format for this stage and process it
accordingly in the payload preparation. The key design idea to
avoid NP-hardness is to work with unconstrained data flow and
inputs in later steps, i. e., the gadgets are arbitrarily stitchable
and work for all inputs. Almost all manual work that is left
to the attacker belongs to her custom payload or to the DOP
instance setup, which can be seen as retargeting our prototype
compiler STEROIDS to a new “platform”.
III. AUTOMATED DOP EXPLOIT COMPILER
In this section, we describe the techniques that enable
automated compilation of DOP programs under consideration
of constrained DOP gadgets, and provide a high-level overview
of STEROIDS’s components and their interactions.
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Fig. 1: Workflow of STEROIDS
A. Assumptions and Attacker Model
Our assumptions are aligned with previous research and we
adopt the general scenario given in the previously reported
DOP instances: First, we assume that the target application is
protected with DEP, ASLR, and advanced control-flow hijack
mitigations such as fine-grained CFI or fine-grained load-time
code randomization. Second, we assume the presence of a
memory corruption vulnerability. Our test cases make use of
both stack-based vulnerabilities and heap-based vulnerabilities
(see Section V). Lastly, we assume that an input triggering the
vulnerability is known.
B. Overview
Figure 1 provides an overview of the inputs, stages, and
intermediary artifacts of our approach. Note that we focus on
the concepts first and give examples for the artifacts and more
detail about their format later in this section.
The dashed rectangle on the bottom left represents the DOP
instance setup with its two components: The gadget definitions
and the driver. The gadget definitions specify the necessary
constraints for the data structures driving the execution of
a specific DOP gadget present in the application. Naturally,
these constraints are highly specific to both the application
and the vulnerability. Conceptually, they directly result from
findings of the gadget search [20]–[22], but are set manually
in our approach. However, to correctly judge the necessary
effort, one has to keep in mind that a gadget definition in
the five target applications we evaluate (see Section V) is on
average only about ten lines long, and that one only needs
to define about half a dozen of them (see Section VI-B). In
context of compilers, the gadget definitions are analogous to
the instructions of a new architecture.
The driver represents the interface to the vulnerable appli-
cation (e. g., it writes to a file or opens a TCP connection
to trigger the initial vulnerability). Given that this is highly
specific to the exploit and the application’s input stream, we
again rely on the attacker to supply the driver.
Now follows the centerpiece of this paper, the payload
preparation. We separate the automatic compilation of DOP
exploits into five stages, which are reflected in the design
of our prototype implementation (see Figure 1). After the
attacker specified her intent using our high-level programming
language, SLANG, we first compile (¶) her DOP script into an
assembly-like format: High-Level DOP-Asm. This High-Level
DOP-Asm is independent of the application, that is, it may
use DOP gadgets which the application does not provide.
In step ·, we use a set of recipes, which encode how to
express DOP gadgets through other DOP gadgets. We use
these recipes and the Op-Graph they implicitly define through
their interdependencies, to lower the High-Level DOP-Asm
into Low-Level DOP-Asm. The latter uses only DOP gadgets
from the gadget definitions, i. e., only DOP gadgets available
for this specific vulnerability and application. For the most
part, the recipes and Op-Graph can be reused for multiple
applications, unlike the application-specific gadget definitions.
The Low-Level DOP-Asm is meant to be read with execu-
tion in mind, but we have to think in terms of data driving
the execution in context of DOP. Thus, in the data-view-
switch (¸), we use the content of the gadget definitions. This
results in the data requirements, which are the constraints for
a data structure that would execute the DOP script if it were
placed in the vulnerable application.
In step ¹, we actually build the data structure fulfilling the
formerly created data requirements. Since this involves po-
tentially expensive constraint-solving, the data structures can
contain placeholders instead of concrete values. An additional
concretization (º) step can then quickly replace constants or
addresses leaked at runtime.
Lastly, we pass the final data structure back to the driver,
in order to execute it in the target application.
C. Modes
The mode element in Figure 1 represents an accumulation
of compiler flags triggering different program transformations,
and indicates the DOP gadget supply mode required for the
specific target DOP instance. There are three separate, but
partially interlocking optional modes: branch-free, memory
preparation, and interactive.
Branch-Free. If one cannot synthesize conditional jumps for
the application, one cannot easily express if/else statements.
Listing 1 shows how to use arithmetics1 to express case
distinction [46]: All operations are executed on the right
side, whereas one needs to conditionally skip operations
on the left side. That is, the right side can do without a
conditional goto. This transformation of an operation
must fulfill two properties: First, it must only have an effect,
if the here-bit is set and second, it may only assume that the
values it uses are properly initialized, if the here-bit is set.
Thus, we compute a here-bit at the start of every basic
blocks by comparing a state-variable to a basic block’s
ID. Then, we can simply change the state-variable instead
of using gotos. The result is that the execution sequence
1This example uses an equality operator, which produces a one if the values
are equal and a zero otherwise. Alternatively, one can place alternative values
in an array and compute different indices, or use conditional DOP gadgets.
of basic blocks is no longer important, only that they are
executed often enough.
Listing 1: Conditional and Branch-Free Code
t = x + y
i f ( z == 3 ) :
r = t
t = x + y
h e r e = z == 3
r = h e r e * t + (1− h e r e ) * r
Memory Preparation. When DOP gadgets are placed in
separate buffers, e.g., in the interactive mode, it may not be
possible to place persistent variables next to the DOP gadgets
using them. However, one can use DOP gadgets to place
the variables somewhere in memory, before the remainder of
the DOP script is executed. This phase therefore collects all
variables, translates their initial values into immediate values
used by DOP gadgets, and transforms the script in order to
use the addresses the variables are written to.
Interactive. A goto DOP gadget is not necessary in the
interactive mode, because the attacker can decide which op-
eration to send next. However, this also places the burden to
decide which operation to send next on the attacker. This is
inherently problematic if the execution state is not known to
the attacker, e. g., if her DOP script requires case distinctions
or loops. Luckily, due to the branch-free transformation, it only
matters that an operation is executed often enough, because
additional executions have no effect. Thus, one big loop would
theoretically suffice to execute any program, e. g., if the DOP
gadgets are saved in a linked list, which the attacker can
corrupt to form a circle. However, executing only what is
needed is obviously more performant.
For reducible programs [47], we can automatically generate
a protocol which details how often to execute which sequence
of basic blocks. Using well-known techniques, we analyze
the CFG, inline functions, and dissect the program into the
building blocks of structured programming: sequences, which
are executed in-order, selections (if/else), for which both the
true path and the false path are executed once, and iterations,
for which we rely on the attacker for annotations in the DOP
script to hint the number of repetitions.
D. Artifacts
Now that we have discussed the stages of our approach, let
us give more details on the used artifacts.
High-Level Language: SLANG. Our tool STEROIDS provides
a high-level language for the development of DOP programs.
Our STEROIDS programming language, SLANG, provides
• compound expressions
• typed variables (addresses, bytes, int16, int32...)
• type-sensitive arrays
– constant initialization: strings, int-arrays, hex-dumps
– automatic length-variable for constant initialization
• structured control-flow
– if/else blocks
– loops: for, while, repeat . . . until, infinite
– break/continue
• (recursion-free) procedures
This is in contrast to Qool [48] for ROP or MinDOP [20] for
DOP, which provide only “list-of-statements” languages. Since
the exemplary scripts in Section IV show that our language
is rather straightforward and conventional, we refrain from
showing the formal grammar of SLANG in this paper, both
for brevity and to omit technicalities.
The compilation from SLANG to High-Level DOP-Asm
itself is also straightforward (e. g., the elements of structures
control flow are compiled to checks, labels and gotos).
Compound expressions are parsed and compiled into single
two-operand operations for each node in the parse tree, using
temporary variables, if necessary. Array accesses multiply the
index with the size of an array element, before using the result
as an offset after dereferencing the array’s address.
DOP assembly. While SLANG is used to define the attacker’s
intent, DOP assembly is used as an intermediary step, but also
as a convenient language for the recipes and for inline-use in
SLANG. It is low-level and assembly-like, where each line
holds a command with its operands. Additionally, it features
• typed variables (addresses, bytes, int16, int32...)
• conditional operations
• labels as jump-targets
• macros, e. g.,
– to generate unique labels or variable names
– to reserve only one temporary variable, if a gadget is
used multiple times
– to perform compile-time computation
• compiler directives, e. g., to tell the compiler
– to advance a program counter
– to increase the size of a packet
For a simple example, refer to Listing 2. Note that the
computation could also be done byte-wise, such that one
requires only 28 ∗ 4 instead of 232 loop iterations.
Listing 2: Recipe to synthesize an add, using
mov, dec, inc and a conditional goto. Suffixes
for the bit-width of the operations and operands are omitted.
add d s t s r c
i n t cpy
mov cpy s r c
: s t a r t
i f z e r o g o t o cpy : end
dec cpy
i n c d s t
go to : s t a r t
: end
Operations Graph. Recipes encode how to synthesize higher-
level operations from simpler ones. The Op-Graph is created
simply by parsing a set of recipes and drawing edge sets from
an operation to the operations used in a specific recipe.
To illustrate our approach, a recipe to express the add
DOP operation (*p += *q) is given in Listing 2. The Op-
Graph in Figure 2 includes the dependencies defined in the
recipe, and shows that add uses five other DOP operations,
indicated by the bold edges. Furthermore, it shows that the
application only has two DOP gadgets: load (*p = **q)
and a conditional goto, indicated by the bold nodes.
loadif_zero_goto
inc decgoto mov
add
Fig. 2: Op-Graph corresponding to the recipe from Listing 2
for synthesizing an add.
A recursive graph search on the Op-Graph starting at the
add-node, shows each DOP operation in this recipe requires
only other DOP operations, which themselves require only
DOP gadgets present in the application. Thus, this recipe can
provide an add DOP operation to the attacker, even though
the application does not have an add DOP gadget.
A goto can be synthesized using a conditional goto
with an always-true dummy condition, and a mov (*p = *q)
can be implemented using a load with one additional indirec-
tion, but expressing inc/dec through a load may be a little
surprising: In Section V-B we describe how to use a lookup
table to achieve this feature.
The lowering of High-Level DOP-Asm to Low-Level DOP-
Asm requires only macro expansion along the found paths to
the DOP gadgets: We successively substitute a DOP operation
with the body of its recipe, taking care to substitute recipe’s
parameters with the DOP operation’s arguments, until we end
up using only DOP gadgets. These are then expanded using
their gadget definitions to form the data requirements.
For convenience, if a DOP operation cannot be synthesized
because of missing DOP gadgets, our compiler generates an
And/Or-graph from the recipes, which reports all possible
alternatives of which DOP operations one would have to
implement to complete said recipes. Furthermore, we designed
our Op-Graphs to be combinable trivially, so simple file
concatenation allows reusing recipes for other applications.
DOP-Gadget Definition. In DOP, one uses skillfully crafted
data structures to drive the program to perform specific opera-
tions. Thus, at one point, one has to switch from the execution-
perspective to the data structure-perspective that is actually
used in the application (see Listing 3 for an example). The
language we use to define data structures is fairly simple:
It supports symbols and constants, which may be initialized
to specific addresses and values, memory dereferences and
offsets, where the latter offers a typed array-index formulation
as syntactic sugar.
Listing 3: Artificial example of a DOP gadget.
struct s { int * va lue , * from , * t o ; } ;
struct s * p t r = . . . ;
// memory corruption of ptr
if ( p t r−>v a l u e == 3)
* ( p t r−>t o ) = * ( p t r−>from ) ;
ptr dst
src
4: from
8: to
0: val = 3
struct s
Fig. 3: Data structure to invoke Listing 3’s DOP gadget.
Listing 4: Gadget definition / Data structure requirements for
the data structure from Figure 3 to feed the DOP gadget from
Listing 3. The address of ptr is an input to the compiler,
while src/dst are the parameters of the DOP gadget.
mov d s t s r c
p t r d e r e f o f f s e t ( 0 ) = 3
p t r d e r e f o f f s e t ( 4 ) = s r c
p t r d e r e f o f f s e t ( 8 ) = d s t
For example, Listing 4 defines the data structure from
Figure 3 to trigger a mov operation. These data requirements
are then transformed into constraints for the Z3 SMT Solver:
We require that, at a certain position in the buffer, there is
an address (ptr). Somewhere else in the buffer, there must
be the value 3, and ptr must point to it. This value must
be followed by another pointer (from), which must have the
value given by the attacker as the second parameter (src),
and yet another pointer (to), which must have the value of
the first parameter (dst).
While it is not necessary for this simple example, our
compiler can handle multiple dereferences and offsets on both
sides of the equation, e. g., to write to a member in a struct.
Protocol. The protocol holds nested sequences of basic blocks
and, if they occur in a loop, optionally how often to execute
that loop. We opted for S-Expressions as an easy-to-parse
format. E. g., we translate the protocol
(BB1, (3, BB2, BB3), BB4)
into the trace
BB1, BB2, BB3, BB2, BB3, BB2, BB3, BB4.
Note that a protocol is only required in the interactive mode,
where DOP gadgets can be combined arbitrarily. Thus, the
protocol is not part of the data requirements and only needs
to be passed to the driver.
E. Implementation Details
We implemented STEROIDS on Linux in Python and use
the Z3 SMT Solver to solve the constraints of the data
requirements. We compiled DOP programs for 32-bit and 64-
bit Linux target applications. Conceptually, it should also work
for other operating systems since the generated data structures
by themselves are not OS-dependent.
Optimizations. STEROIDS is meant to provide maximum
flexibility in its compile targets, since essentially every DOP-
instance offers different DOP gadgets, and we therefore chose
generality over efficiency. Still, when emitting DOP assembly,
STEROIDS tries to use the simplest DOP operation. E. g.,
by emitting inc/dec instead of add/sub, or by avoiding
the oftentimes rather expensive neq/eq DOP gadgets when
comparing against a constant, in favor of calculating the
condition of a conditional DOP gadget at compile time.
Furthermore, we allow annotations for weighted edges in
the Op-Graph. By default, a DOP gadget native to the target
application has a weight of one and a goto a weight of ten to
account for repeated execution of a loop-body. Our compiler
can then sums the weights of all the used DOP gadgets and
pick the recipes with the lowest cumulative weight. STEROIDS
also reduces swapping when lowering complex expression, and
it does not add or subtract zero. Furthermore, it tries to avoid
multiplying by one, e. g., when computing the indices to an
array access, if the array is defined as a byte array.
IV. DOP SCRIPTS
This section presents a selection of high-level exploit pay-
loads implemented in SLANG. They not only demonstrate the
capabilities of DOP and STEROIDS regarding expressiveness
and complexity of payloads, but also security implications, be-
cause they feature ROP chain relocation and on-the-fly gadget
search against targets without a built-in scripting engine.
Listing 5: Slang-code to compute the Levenshtein distance.
b y t e [ ] s = "kitten"
b y t e [ ] t = "sitting"
b y t e [ 5 6 ] d
func i d x ( i n t the row , i n t t h e c o l , i n t wid th )
i d x = the row * wid th + t h e c o l
func min ( i n t a , i n t b , i n t c )
min = a
if ( b < min )
min = b
if ( c < min )
min = c
for j from 0 to s . l e n g t h + 1
call i d x ( 0 , j , s . l e n g t h + 1)
d [ i d x ] = j
for i from 0 to t . l e n g t h
call i d x ( i + 1 , 0 , s . l e n g t h + 1)
d [ i d x ] = i + 1
for j from 0 to s . l e n g t h
i n t j p l u s 1 = j + 1
call i d x ( i , j + 1 , s . l e n g t h + 1)
i n t d e l c o s t = d [ i d x ] + 1
call i d x ( i + 1 , j , s . l e n g t h + 1)
i n t i n s c o s t = d [ i d x ] + 1
call i d x ( i , j , s . l e n g t h + 1)
i n t s u b c o s t = d [ i d x ]
if ( s [ j ] != t [ i ] )
s u b c o s t += 1
call min ( d e l c o s t , i n s c o s t , s u b c o n s t )
call i d x ( i + 1 , j + 1 , s . l e n g t h + 1)
d [ i d x ] = min
A. A classic algorithm: Levenshtein distance
We chose the Levenshtein distance [49] as an introductory
example, because it is a well-known algorithm and allows to
assess the compilation and execution times for the applica-
tions. It computes the edit distance between two strings, i. e.,
the number of operations necessary to transform one string into
the other. In particular, our SLANG implementation in Listing 5
features: 1) Nested for-loops, requiring checking values for
equality and conditional jumping. 2) 2D-array operations, i. e.,
memory access uses indices, which are computed using mul-
tiplication. 3) Numeric comparison and conditional execution
to compute the minimum of three numbers. 4) Functions to
compute minimum and indices.
B. SSL pointer-chain dereference
In OpenSSL, the data structure for saving an SSL private
key is fairly complicated: From a base object (ssl_ctx), one
has to successively follow a chain of eight pointers at different
offsets in their respective data structures, to finally reach the
secret key (see Listing 6). We adapted this example from Hu et.
al [20], because it shows the use of a high-level description for
a non-trivial BYOSE-attack. Naturally, not every application
uses SSL private keys and such a base object may not always
be withing immediate reach in every application. However, this
is still a realistic attack, which is impossible without either an
adaptive multi-step attack leaking data or a scripting engine.
Note that one should not judge the script’s complexity by it’s
brevity: Our experiments will show that executing it without
optimization can require thousands of DOP gadgets.
Listing 6: Slang-code to retrieve a private key from SSL.
# The a d d r e s s o f ( o r o f f s e t t o ) s s l c t x i s
# g i v e n as a p a r a m e t e r t o t h e c o m p i l e r .
add r p −> s s l c t x
i n t [ ] o f f s e t s = [10 0 4 20 24 0 0]
for i from 0 to o f f s e t s . l e n g t h
p =* p
p += o f f s e t s [ i ]
# At t h i s p o i n t , p p o i n t s t o t h e p r i v a t e key and can
# be c o p i e d t o an a d d r e s s o f t h e a t t a c k e r ’ s c h o i c e .
C. ROP-chain Relocation
To account for ASLR, one can relocate a return-oriented
programming chain (ROP chain), which means adjusting the
addresses of the ROP gadgets (ROP gadgets) in the ex-
ploit buffer using a dynamically retrieved address. Attackers
usually utilize a built-in scripting engine to perform this
step, but this example accomplishes this task using DOP,
demonstrating that this kind of attack can be applied to target
applications without a built-in scripting engine. As Listing 7
shows, the attacker merely provides the address of a code
pointer (addr_of_code_pointer), like a return address
on the stack or a function pointer, and the offset between
the code pointer and the image base (offset_to_base).
Furthermore, she prepares the exploit buffer using the offset
between the image base and the ROP gadgets, as it would be in
a non-randomized address layout. Again, the brevity indicates
rather SLANG’s expressiveness than the script’s complexity: It
may very well require executing thousands of DOP gadgets.
Listing 7: Slang code to relocate a ROP chain.
b y t e [ ] r o p c h a i n = { . . . }
# A ROP−c h a i n h o l d s da t a , mixed wi th a d d r e s s e s
# o f ROP−g a d g e t s . Th i s a r r a y h o l d s t h e o f f s e t s
# o f t h o s e a d d r e s s e s i n t h e ROP−c h a i n b u f f e r .
i n t g a d g e t o f f s e t s [ ] = [0 x0C 0x14 0x24 0x28 0x2C ]
add r image base =* a d d r o f c o d e p o i n t e r
image base −= o f f s e t t o b a s e
# R e l o c a t e each g a d g e t .
for i from 0 to g a d g e t o f f s e t s . l e n g t h
r o p c h a i n [ g a d g e t o f f s e t s [ i ] ] += image base
Listing 8: An exemplary ROP chain to execute
execve("/bin/sh") in 32-bit Linux.
0x00 : / / b i 0x18 : &b u f f e r
0x04 : n / sh 0x1C : &(pop ecx ; r e t )
0x08 : 00 00 00 00 0x20 : &b u f f e r + 8
0x0C : &(pop eax ; r e t ) 0x24 : &(pop edx ; r e t )
0x10 : 0B 00 00 00 0x28 : &b u f f e r + 8
0x14 : &(pop ebx ; r e t ) 0x2C : &( i n t 0x80 )
D. Just-in-time return-oriented programming (JIT-ROP)
The relocation approach from the previous example does
not work anymore, if a binary is protected with fine-grained
code randomization such as Binary Stirring [24], because
most of the previously known ROP gadgets are eliminated.
Instead, an attacker can employ JIT-ROP to dynamically scan
the process memory to search required gadgets on-the-fly, and
assemble the ROP chain in the exploit buffer accordingly.
Our implementation probes the program’s code memory for
specific gadgets and then uses their locations in a freshly
generated ROP chain. Just like the other examples, the Slang
script in Listing 9 can be compiled and executed for interactive
and non-interactive mode DOP instances without changes.
Listing 9: Slang-code to scan the memory for ROP gadgets.
# pop eax , pop ebx , pop ecx , pop edx , i n t 0x80
b y t e [ ] g b y t e s = {58 c3 5b c3 59 c3 5 a c3 cd 80}
i n t [ ] g l e n g t h s = [2 2 2 2 2]
i n t [ ] g o f f s e t s = [0 x0C 0x14 0x24 0x28 0x2C ]
add r s t a r t a d d r =* a d d r o f c o d e p o i n t e r
func i s g a d g e t ( add r a , b y t e [ ] gadge t , i n t g l e n g t h )
for i from 0 to g l e n g t h
if ( g a d g e t [ i ] != a [ i ] )
return 0
return 1
b y t e [ ] c u r g b y t e s = g b y t e s
for j from 0 to g o f f s e t s . l e n g t h
add r a t = s t a r t a d d r
loop
call i s g a d g e t ( a t , c u r g b y t e s , g l e n g t h s [ j ] )
if ( i s g a d g e t == 1)
r o p c h a i n [ g o f f s e t s [ j ] ] = a t
break
a t += 1
c u r g b y t e s += g l e n g t h s [ j ]
TABLE I: Comparison of the evaluated DOP-instances.
1: Implicitly, because the conditional command is present.
2: There is only one packet in memory at a time, thus one
packet cannot modify the contents of the next packet.
3: Implicitly, through self-modifying DOP.
4: Synthesized from mov and add DOP gadget sequence.
5: Implicitly, through interactive mode/branch-free code.
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Arithmetic
inc (*p += 1) 7 X1 7 7 7
conditional inc
(if(...) *p += 1) 7 X 7 7 7
add (*p += *q) X 7 X X X
sub (*p -= *q) X 7 7 7 7
mul (*p *= *q) X 7 7 7 7
gte (*p = *p ≥ *q) X 7 7 7 7
Movement
mov (*p = *q) X X X X X1
conditional mov
(if(...) *p = *q) 7 7 7 7 X
load (*p = **q) 7 X X X1 X
conditional load
(if(...) *p = **q) 7 7 7 X 7
store (**p = *q) 7 X (X)3 X2,4 X
Control-Flow
goto X1 X X (X)5 (X)5
conditional goto X X (X)3 (X)5 (X)5
calculated goto X X 7 (X)5 (X)5
Mode
interactive 7 7 7 X X
self-modifying X 72 X X2,4 7
V. APPLICATIONS WITH DOP INSTANCES
We compiled and executed the example DOP scripts above
for the five different applications we present in this section.
Note that we only crafted the first of them: The other four were
not “homemade” by us. Table I provides a comparison of the
DOP instances with respect to the available DOP gadgets.
A. Interpreter
This bytecode interpreter is an exemplary application, which
loads a file filled with bytecode into memory and then in-
terprets the embedded instructions. Thus, this DOP instance
is compatible with the non-interactive gadget chaining mode,
although it does not require the exploitation of a memory error.
The interpreter has three arithmetic instructions: addi-
tion, subtraction, and multiplication. It also has an instruc-
tion to move data, and a conditional goto to modify
the control-flow. Since the application internally uses an
instruction-counter, both a goto and a calculated goto
can be implemented by modifying its value.
The interpreter’s comparably rich set of DOP gadgets is by
far not complete: E. g., there are no comparison operators for
(in)equality. Also, since the operand size is fixed to 32 bit,
it is not immediately suitable to work on single bytes. Most
importantly, this DOP instance lacks load/store gadgets.
Challenges. To interact with memory outside the DOP in-
stance, we bootstrapped the load/store gadgets using self-
modifying DOP. Since the data structures for all DOP gadgets
are already in memory, an operation can alter the operands of
other operations. We leverage a mov to overwrite the source or
destination of another mov with values computed at runtime.
Thus, we can simulate native load/store gadgets. Note
that mov is the “weakest” of the three basic data movement
DOP operations, and thus, any of the three can be used to
synthesize the other two. This however, may not hold without
self-modifying DOP. As we will see in the Section VI, this
application shows that DOP gadgets such as add and mul are
very important for the efficiency of the overall DOP-instance.
B. Wireshark
The packet analyzer Wireshark suffered from a stack-buffer
overflow (CVE-2014-2299), which ultimately results in packet
contents overflowing local variables (specifically cinfo) and
parameters (specifically packet_list). Listing 10 shows
the relevant lines for this application’s DOP gadgets.
Detailed descriptions are available in the literature [20],
[50], so we only give a brief summary of triggering the DOP
gadgets here. Setting specific values to struct members of
packet_list and cinfo enables mov/load/store and
conditional inc DOP gadgets. However, the condition
and the target of the conditional inc are not indepen-
dent of one another, as they stem from the same value. Thus,
one has to set up a fake packet_list data structure in
memory, and use a mov/inc/mov-sequence to increment
an arbitrary memory address. Additionally, a fake linked-list
pointing at itself has to be employed to create an endless
loop and keep the DOP instance running. Furthermore, the
file position indicator serves as a virtual instruction pointer:
manipulating its value results in a non-linear sequence of
packets being read and enables a goto. The exploit payload
is given at one go, but the data structures are being loaded to
memory one by one. Thus, this DOP instance has properties
of interactive and non-interactive modes: single-shot exploit,
native goto, but no self-modifying DOP.
Listing 10: Partial Wireshark source code showing the lines
for mov/load/store and conditional inc DOP gadgets.
r e c o r d = p a c k e t l i s t−>p h y s i c a l r o w s [ row ] ;
r e c o r d−>c o l t e x t [ c o l ] =
( g c h a r * ) c i n f o−>c o l d a t a [ c o l ] ;
if ( ! r e c o r d−>c o l t e x t l e n [ c o l ] )
++ p a c k e t l i s t−>c o n s t s t r i n g s ;
Challenges. Arithmetic operations are severely hampered
since the only arithmetic DOP gadget is an inc, but expres-
sive programs can still be compiled and the resulting DOP
programs are efficient enough to pose a security threat.
To synthesize an add using the recipe given in Listing 2,
we implemented an 8-bit dec using a 256-byte lookup table.
This table is placed at a 256-byte aligned address, and its
ith value is initialized to i − 1 mod 256. Now, we can write
the value we want to decrement into the lowest byte of the
address to the lookup table, and load the value saved there. The
implication of this construct is severe: We crafted an arithmetic
DOP operation using only data-movement DOP operations.
C. Gstreamer
The Gstreamer multimedia framework suffered from a heap-
corruption vulnerability (CESA-2016-0004) in its decoder
for FLIC files, which are GIF-like animations. In particular,
the vulnerability repeatedly allows to write arbitrary byte-
sequences to arbitrary, positive offsets. The decoding happens
in a fresh thread of a fresh process and since a thread’s
heap is usually aligned to 64 MB, the last three bytes of the
addresses of multiple relevant heap objects are basically static.
Evans published an exploit for this vulnerability and the write-
up contains lots of technical details [51]. The author makes
heavy use of partial pointer overwrites (namely, the last three
bytes to keep the unknown first bytes intact) to modify the
addresses used by two memcpys to move data arbitrarily,
to dereference pointers and even to abuse the frame-time
calculation to perform addition. To do so, a fake GstPad-
instance is created to avoid leaving the main loop, and data is
copied into the input buffer to create new DOP gadgets, i. e.,
self-modifying DOP is used. Ultimately, a code-reuse attack is
launched by crafting a call to the system-function. Listing 11
shows the details relevant for DOP.
Unlike the other applications, this one does not use a 32-bit
address space, and thus shows that STEROIDS can also deal
with 64-bit applications. Furthermore, this DOP instance does
not rely on a stack corruption, but leverages a heap corruption,
demonstrating that STEROIDS works across bug classes.
Challenges. While the exploit by Evans is certainly nifty, we
have to go significantly beyond the published write-up.
In GStreamer, data is first read in 4 KB-sized chunks
into a linked-list of GstMemory-objects. A class called
GstAdapter is then responsible to merge these chunks of
memory to accommodate the size the decoder actually needs.
In this specific decoder, every frame is freshly allocated and
therefore, their addresses become more unpredictable over
time. Evans did not have to deal with this, because the entire
exploit fit into the first 4 KB-chunk. However, reallocation is
not acceptable for larger DOP programs: Our examples easily
grew to 90 KB. Thus, we bootstrap our DOP programs by
first copying their main content into the frame-buffer and then
creating a fake GstAdapter-object to trick the application
into thinking that there is only one big memory object.
This not only facilitates reliable frame-wise self-modifying
DOP, but also allows to modify the skip-, size- and
assembled_len-variables of the GstAdapter-object to
redirect DOP execution to arbitrary frames. Conceptually, this
still belongs to the steps of gadget search and DOP instance
setup to facilitate the execution of DOP gadgets, which is not
in this paper’s scope. We thus do not automate this task. In
practice however, we used our flexible compilation and recipe
mechanism to make it considerably easier. The second chal-
lenge is the addressing. The instructions that place constant
data use relative offsets, but the memcpys naturally require
absolute addresses. Furthermore, the predictable addresses are
all in the three byte-vicinity around the frame-buffer. Thus,
a second bootstrap-step dynamically discloses the first bytes
of the heap-objects and fixes the addresses of all indirectly
addressed DOP-variables. Note that our compiler generates
both these steps automatically.
As for the actual DOP gadgets, the mov-, load- and
add-instructions were already described by Evans [51] and
are rather straightforward. However, the arbitrary store-
gadget was more challenging, because the native code does
not contain the required data flow. We constructed the store-
gadget by overwriting operands of a mov-gadget at run time
utilizing self-modifying DOP. While conditional goto
is not a strict requirement for Turing-complete computation,
it helps to avoid unreasonable large payload sizes for com-
plex DOP programs. We use the fact that the FLIC-decoder
skips frames with the wrong header ID and we leverage
the fake GstAdapter and self-modifying DOP to skip
frames by modifying their header IDs in order to construct
a conditional goto-gadget.
Listing 11: Partial GStreamer source code showing reading
from an arbitrary address to the frame buffer’s start (dest),
placing of constant data at a chosen location in or after the
frame buffer, writing to an arbitrary address, and the addition.
f l x d e c o d e d e l t a f l i ( . . . ) {
. . .
// read; attacker controls content of flxdec
memcpy ( d e s t , f l x d e c−>d e l t a d a t a , f l x d e c−>s i z e ) ;
// attacker also controls contents of data...
s t a r t l i n e = ( d a t a [ 0 ] + ( d a t a [ 1 ] << 8 ) ) ;
l i n e s = ( d a t a [ 2 ] + ( d a t a [ 3 ] << 8 ) ) ;
d a t a += 4 ;
d e s t += ( f l x d e c−>hdr . wid th * s t a r t l i n e ) ;
while ( l i n e s −−) {
. . .
c o u n t = * d a t a ++;
while ( c o u n t −−) {
. . .
// ... which determines offset and written value
* d e s t ++ = * d a t a ++;
}
}
}
. . .
g s t f l x d e c c h a i n ( . . . ) {
. . .
while ( . . . ) {
// calls flx_decode_delta_fli
f l x d e c o d e c h u n k s ( . . . ) ;
. . .
// write; attacker controls content of flxdec
memcpy ( f l x d e c−>d e l t a d a t a ,
f l x d e c−>f r a me da t a , f l x d e c−>s i z e ) ;
. . .
// add
f l x d e c−>n e x t t i m e += f l x d e c f r a m e t i m e ;
}
. . .
}
D. Mini-Server
Hu et al. [20] modeled this application after an FTP-Server
to serve as an example for DOP. However, please note that
it is in no way tailored to our compiler. The application
suffers from a stack-based buffer overflow when reading data
from a socket into a local buffer. Invoking the three DOP
gadgets given in Listing 12 is fairly straightforward. However,
one has to take care to preserve local variables, i. e., to
reset connect_limit with each DOP-packet. Also, the
parameter buf for readData is pushed onto the stack only
once and needs to be restored each iteration.
Challenges. The mov DOP gadget cannot move all values,
e.g., the value STREAM triggers another gadget. Thus, we
opted to use the load to implement a general purpose mov
for this application. We also had to use a temporary scratch
space for the conditional load, because its else-case
clobbers some adjacent values.
This DOP instance lacks the very important store gadget,
which is necessary to write to arrays and other memory
locations. Due to the interactive mode we cannot leverage
self-modifying DOP to synthesize store from mov/load.
Luckily, the mov and add DOP gadget are executed in
sequence in a single packet. Thus, we can use the mov to
modify the parameters of the add DOP gadget. This yields a
store-add combination: *(*p+4) += *q, where the 4 stems
from the different offsets for typ and total. Adjusting that
offset leads to a **p += *q DOP gadget. To convert this
into a pure store, we first use this DOP gadget to add the
value at **p to itself, effectively multiplying it by two. In base
two, this introduces a zero at the lowest bit. By repeating this
32 times, we can store a zero at a location of our choice.
Finally, we invoke this DOP gadget a 33rd time, adding *q
to the zero, which results in the desired store-DOP gadget
(**p = *q). Again, the implication is severe: We used an
arithmetic gadget (add) to achieve data-movement2.
Listing 12: Partial Mini-Server source code showing the
conditional load, mov, and add DOP gadgets. size,
srv, type and connect_limit are local variables.
while ( c o n n e c t l i m i t −−) {
r e a d D a t a ( sockfd , buf ) ; // stack buffer overflow
if (* t y p e == NONE) break ;
if (* t y p e == STREAM) // conditional load
* s i z e = *( s rv−>cur max ) ;
else {
s rv−>t y p = * t y p e ; // mov
s rv−> t o t a l += * s i z e ; // add
}}
E. ProFTPd
An integer overflow, which results in a stack-based buffer
overflow, in the FTP server ProFTPd (CVE-2006-5815) allows
the attacker to write almost arbitrarily into the process’ mem-
ory. As a result, multiple DOP gadgets are available, which
allow Turing-complete computation. There are six functions
involved and the example is well-documented in the liter-
ature [20], [50], so we omit the vulnerable code. ProFTPd
2 Other constructs are possible, too. E. g., using only dec and mul: to
move q to p, one multiplies p by 0, decrements it, multiplies it by −1 and
finally multiplies it by q.
allows an interactive DOP-mode, but needs two packets per
DOP gadget.
Challenges. Triggering the conditional mov gadget was
straightforward. The add DOP gadget operates on a fixed
global data structure, so one has to first move the two operands
into said data structure, invoke the add, and then fetch the
result. The load and store gadgets need to perform the
double-dereferencing in two steps, which can be performed as
a regular two-packet DOP gadget, but one needs additional
movs to place the parameters accordingly.
F. nginx
A flaw in the chunked size parser enables the attacker to
inject a very large size number. Due to an unsafe unsigned to
signed conversion that number can be interpreted as negative
bypassing a buffer size check, which leads to a stack-based
buffer overflow (CVE-2013-2028). Previous work [20] ana-
lyzed this bug, but ruled it out for DOP. We achieved a proof-
of-concept DOP instance, albeit with limited capabilities.
Challenges. The target data structure
ngx_http_request_t is used in many places, is
therefore heavily constrained and clobbers many struct fields.
We resolved this by rarely moving the struct in memory
and fulfilling the constraints with memory preparation.
Even though a conditional load and byte inc
are available, the interactive mode impedes synthesizing
mov/store. While this DOP instance can compute
arithmetic operations and move values among the limited
number of write slots, the store-constraint prevented us
from running complex DOP scripts.
VI. EVALUATION
To evaluate the capabilities of STEROIDS, we have compiled
each of our four showcase DOP scripts against all five different
applications from the last section. We then measured both
compilation time and runtime, the size of the generated DOP
program, and the number of executed DOP gadgets. Influences
on runtime, results for optimized DOP scripts, and the number
of necessary DOP gadgets are also discussed.
A. Quantitative Analysis
We conducted our experiments on Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS,
using a single core of an Intel i7 @ 2.9 GHz with 4 GB RAM.
For the Levenshtein algorithm, we measured the runtime of
comparing a 7-character string against an 8-character string.
Since not every application comes with SSL, we artificially
added the relevant data structure into the program, and mea-
sured how long it took to dereference it. For the Relocator,
we measured how long it took to relocate a given ROP chain.
In our JIT-ROP example, however, the runtime of the algo-
rithm depends heavily on where in memory the ROP gadgets
are located. For comparable results, we thus normalized the
algorithms to always scan exactly one kilobyte of memory.
Our results are summarized in Table II and Table III.
The compile time scales roughly linear with the number of
DOP gadgets. One DOP gadget takes about 150ms, which is
TABLE II: Evaluation of DOP programs compiled for three non-interactive applications: Interpreter, GStreamer, and Wireshark.
1: Optimizations: Loop unrolling; using variables instead of array.
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Levenshtein SSL-Deref Relocator JIT-ROP JIT-ROP1
DOP gadgets 183 17 23 99 56
Compile Time 23.14s 1.53s 1.61s 12.11s 1.85s
... per DOP gadget 0.12s 0.09s 0.07s 0.12s 0.03s
Execution Time 0.29s 0.19s 0.20s 0.51s 0.49s
... per DOP gadget 0.50µs 1898.89µs 2115.79µs 0.14µs 0.35µs
Executed DOP gadgets 5855 99 95 35982 14180
DOP gadgets 4407 1930 1419 2503 2689
Compile Time 179.75s 108.96s 91.62s 133.37s 107.89s
... per DOP gadget 0.04s 0.06s 0.06s 0.05s 0.04s
Execution Time 8.43s 0.75s 0.70s 77.85s 13.39s
... per DOP gadget 2.81µs 3.59µs 3.84µs 2.91µs 2.85µs
Executed DOP gadgets 2,994,468 210,989 195,758 26,733,658 4,691,568
DOP gadgets 2284 265 317 740 1079
Compile Time 467.89s 59.72s 102.47s 227.07s 334.75s
... per DOP gadget 0.20s 0.22s 0.36s 0.31s 0.31s
Execution Time 16.33s 1.45s 1.59s 228.50s 149.58s
... per DOP gadget 84.75µs 728.91µs 447.12µs 86.52µs 81.03µs
Executed DOP gadgets 192,676 1,992 3,565 2,640,980 1,845,845
TABLE III: Evaluation of DOP programs compiled for two interactive applications: Mini-Server and ProFTPd.
1: Optimization: Loop-Check against constant.
2: Optimization: Loop unrolling; no branch-free transformation, since it is only one Basic Block.
3: Optimization: Using a single 16-bit-compare instead of two 8-bit compares. *: Estimated.
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Levenshtein Levenstein1 SSL-Deref SSL-Deref2 Relocator Relocator2 JIT-ROP3 JIT-ROP1
DOP gadgets 5466 4789 762 141 1112 37 594 316
Compile Time 807.37s 686.47s 93.91s 17.68s 117.43s 10.86s 80.54s 50.40s
... per DOP gadget 0.14s 0.14s 0.12s 0.12s 0.11s 0.29s 0.14s 0.16s
Execution Time 5360.64s 420.36s 14.71s 0.62s 61.48s 0.25s *22,956.00s 190.67s
... per DOP gadget 1.28ms 1.28ms 1.39ms 4.46ms 1.28ms 6.83ms *1.28ms 1.28ms
Executed DOP gadgets 4,178,599 327,671 11,269 141 47,921 37 17,894,894 148,625
DOP gadgets 2946 2813 354 126 607 72 501 195
Compile Time 471.37s 447.27s 59.83s 23.56s 98.94s 21.74s 84.17s 33.15s
... per DOP gadget 0.16s 0.16s 0.17s 0.19s 0.16s 0.30s 0.17s 0.17s
Execution Time 3245.78s 1641.69s 6.93s 0.59s 49.21s 0.56s *20,008.00s 123.95s
... per DOP gadget 1.31ms 1.31ms 1.32ms 4.69ms 1.31ms 7.18ms *1.31ms 1.31ms
Executed DOP gadgets 2,472,032 1,250,336 5,243 126 37,452 72 15,238,408 96,406
mostly spent by the SMT solver to create the data structures.
Naturally, more complex data structures have a tendency to
take longer, especially when they are nested or when there
are arrays involved. However, unless the available space for
a data structure is very close to the minimal space necessary,
we found the compile time to be fairly stable.
Note that this step can oftentimes be parallelized, if one
decouples the compilation of single DOP gadgets. This can
also be used in the interactive case, e. g., for GStreamer.
However, since we evaluated on a single core, the additional
overhead of starting separate processes may outweigh the
benefit of simpler constraint solving. Furthermore, we noted
that a noteworthy portion of a program’s DOP gadgets are
usually identical, which makes caching an attractive time saver
during development.
A comparison of the number of executed DOP gadgets in
Table II (e. g., for the Levenshtein algorithm) shows that the
non-interactive mode enables efficient execution of DOP pro-
grams, even if the underlying application offers only minimal
arithmetic capabilities. For the Interpreter, the runtime is even
clearly dominated by the time to start the process (e. g., for the
Relocator). However, a single DOP gadget in the interactive
mode is roughly three orders of magnitude slower, because
network-interaction dominates the runtime, despite using a
local loopback interface in our experiments.
The DOP instance in Wireshark is non-interactive, but it
reads the data structure for every single DOP gadget from
a file. Hence, it spends a large amount of its runtime with
file I/O. Similarly, GStreamer invokes costly malloc- and
memcpy-operations for every DOP gadget, even before the
actual gadget is executed. Nevertheless, the biggest impact
of runtime stems from the lack of powerful DOP gadgets
for arithmetic, in particular for equality comparisons and
multiplications, which are utilized for array accesses. E. g. a
subtraction operation would remedy this situation. This effect
is most pronounced in the Wireshark example, because it does
not even have an efficient add, which then has to be expressed
through repeated inc.
While the execution time naturally has a certain variance,
the chosen DOP programs are deterministic and there are many
executed DOP gadgets. This seems to average out the execu-
tion time per DOP gadget in individual target applications,
especially since the runtime is usually dominated by factors
other than computation.
These experiments show that STEROIDS facilitates the
automatic compilation of DOP programs from a high-level
language. Especially since the intermediary High-Level DOP-
Asm and Low-Level DOP-Asm scripts are kept around, we
argue that the generated programs can serve as an even more
useful starting point for hand-crafted optimization.
If one reduces the number of the aforementioned problem-
atic operations in SLANG, e. g, by using different variables
instead of arrays or using pointer-arithmetic instead of array-
indices to reduce multiplications, one can speed up the DOP
program considerably (see last column of Table III). Especially
when the number of loop iterations is known beforehand,
the costly equality-check against a variable can be avoided.
Instead one compares with a constant, which can often be
implemented with a much cheaper conditional DOP operation
(see last column of Table II). For a small and fixed number of
iterations one can also unroll the loop to avoid the comparison
altogether.
In the interactive gadget chaining mode, the attacker may
not know the current state, e.g., specific values of variables,
of the DOP instance during runtime. Consequently, computed
branches are not supported, because the Driver on the attacker
machine has no means to evaluate branch decisions and select
the next DOP gadget. This branch-free transformation of the
code has a huge performance impact. First, it increases the
number of DOP operations. Second, loops cannot be exited
early, because the attacker does not know whether the loop-
condition is met and must therefore iterate, until an upper
approximation of loop iterations is reached. This is especially
critical for nested loops (e. g., in Levenshtein or JIT-ROP).
B. Implemented DOP operations
DOP operations fall into three separate categories: First, the
DOP gadgets, which are implemented as gadget definitions,
require the data-view of DOP. They are a little tricky to
implement and they are highly specific to both the application
and the vulnerability, so that it is unlikely that they can be
reused. Luckily, one has to implement only very few of them.
As Table IV shows, a new target application requires about five
of these with an average length of 8.6 lines of code. GStreamer
is the clear exception, because only the DOP operation to write
constant data is implemented in this way.
Second, application-specific DOP operations, which are
implemented in Low-Level DOP-Asm. They also have to deal
with the oddities of the application, e. g, clobbered adjacent
values, input values for which they do not work or application-
specific variables. It is important, however, that these DOP
operations do not export such behavior, i. e., they define
clean High-Level DOP-Asm. Since the execution-view is more
familiar, and since one deals with expected, albeit cumbersome
behavior, they are much easier to implement. However, it is
still unlikely that such a recipe can be reused for another
application. There are again only about five of these DOP
operations necessary to support a new application, because
TABLE IV: Number of implemented DOP operations.
Different operand sizes were ignored for this table, as recipes
for conversion are all reusable, and usually just use temporary
variables to zero-extend or save parts of the operands.
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they usually only serve to correct the oddities of the underlying
DOP gadgets. Wireshark in particular has to deal with this,
which explains the high count of application-specific DOP
operations. The exceptionally high line count for these DOP
operations for the Mini-Server is caused by a single outlier:
The store-add-to-store-gadget requires 72 lines.
Lastly, there are reusable DOP operations. They use only
properly working DOP operations and are thus fairly easy to
implement, despite using more lines. As Table IV shows, one
needs roughly a dozen of these to execute all the DOP pro-
grams from our experiments on a particular target application.
More importantly, Table IV also shows that, if one keeps
the distinction between these three categories in mind, e. g.,
with a naming convention to rule out accidental mix-ups, one
can reuse many DOP operations. For example, four of the five
target applications share the recipe for mul and sub. All in
all, about 75 % of the DOP operations without application-
specific oddities actually are reused. Also note the high count
for the Mini-Server and ProFTPd. Both require the branch-
free mode, which in turn requires gadgets that only have an
effect, if the here-bit of a basic block is set. Not a single
DOP operation from this category had to be implemented
additionally to support ProFTPd.
In summary, to support four algorithms, we needed about
15-20 recipes per application, each having roughly 10 lines.
While they may require domain knowledge to circumvent the
app’s peculiarities, writing them is (roughly) as simple as
writing assembly. We found that about half of the recipes can
be reused from other applications, and that they furthermore
share certain patterns, which makes writing new recipes easier.
Over time, we expect that more recipes can be reused and that
therefore less recipes need to be implemented from scratch.
Finally, note that an attacker is likely to only implement a very
limited number of DOP gadgets for one specific payload.
VII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the security implications of the
possibility to write complex DOP programs, limitations of our
approach, and possible future work.
A. DOP Expressiveness
Our experiments have clearly shown that more powerful
DOP instances lead to more efficient DOP programs. Still, it is
also clear that remarkably little is necessary for DOP. E. g., our
branch-free transformation not only shows that the interactive
mode is just as expressive as the non-interactive mode, but also
that neither a virtual program counter nor conditional DOP
gadgets are necessary.
Furthermore, we have shown in the Interpreter example,
that the data-movement DOP gadgets can express one an-
other, i. e., that having either mov or load or store can
be sufficient. The Wireshark example again lowers the bar
for Turing-complete DOP by showing that one can express
arithmetic gadgets through data-movement, while the Mini-
Server example shows that data-movement gadgets can express
arithmetics. Lastly, none of our exemplary real-world target
applications has a native logical gadget.
B. System Interaction
I/O is certainly useful, but we argue that arbitrary compu-
tations in another program’s memory are useful on its own,
e. g., to change the program’s state or to compute values for
further attack steps, like the DOP scripts in our evaluation.
Naturally, DOP can only interact with the system, if the
necessary system calls happen to be reachable via data flows.
In this case, a recipe for a system call DOP gadget could
be crafted. Alternatively, one would have to alter the control
flow, i. e., use a recipe to wrap redirection, system call and
return. While this could certainly be facilitated by DOP, one
would cross the border of pure DOP. Similar to traditional
code-reuse, an attacker is much more likely to use DOP to
bootstrap an additional attack-phase to accomplish the chosen
task in an easier way.
C. Security Implications
Our exemplary DOP scripts demonstrate how DOP and
BYOSE can aid in leaking sensitive memory, in relocating
a ROP chain to bypass coarse-grained code-layout random-
ization, and in finding ROP gadgets on-the-fly to bypass fine-
grained code-layout randomization. However, there are other
attacks against more powerful defense primitives, which also
require a scripting environment. Thus, applications lacking a
scripting environment are immune to those attacks, unless,
of course, DOP is possible. E. g., one can bypass coarse-
grained CFI [52] by probing the memory for ROP gadgets still
usable even with the CFI policy in place. Evans et al. [53]
bypassed the 64-bit version of code-pointer integrity (CPI),
which protects sensitive pointers, by efficiently locating the
safe-region it uses to hide its metadata. Furthermore, variants
of XOM are vulnerable to runtime attacks deducting not-yet-
protected bytes [54].
We believe the recent progression of DOA and DOP indicate
that the research community should consider protecting data-
flow and data structures when designing new systems defenses.
D. Limitations
Our research prototype has several limitations, which we
want to discuss here together with their implications.
Data-Pointers. Our attacks may require a few data pointers
or offsets as input, which may have to be leaked or guessed
first. It can be argued that there are situations, where this is
not excluded by the presence of ASLR (e. g., static modules,
info leaks, process forks using the same memory layout,
incompatible defenses, etc.), but it means that our exploits
technically may not circumvent traditional ASLR. However,
regarding code-reuse attacks, defenses like fine-grained code
randomization [24] would be a stronger drop-in replacement
for ASLR, but since they do not need to modify the data
layout they are likely not to require such hard-to-guess data
pointers. Furthermore, analogously to attacks targeting code-
pointers [55], the GStreamer example shows that there are
applications, in which relative offsets instead of absolute
addresses suffice for DOP-attacks.
End-to-End Exploitation. While we deem this work to be
a substantial improvement in automating DOP, it does not
result in the fully automated construction of end-to-end DOP
exploits. Firstly, the definitions of an application’s DOP gad-
gets are not generated automatically. While we, conceptually,
use the output of previous work [20], the format and details
of said definition require manual effort. Secondly, embedding
the data structure in the application’s input and interfacing
the application is left to the attacker, although our tools
automatically generate the invocations to the interface.
Optimizations. Our prototype STEROIDS uses little traditional
compiler optimization, like constant folding or common subex-
pressions reuse. However, in exploitation, a slightly better or
smaller program may not merely be faster, but increase the
chance of success substantially.
E. Future Work
Naturally, many technical limitations mentioned above can
be seen as future work. However, we also want to discuss what
we feel to be conceptual gaps in our understanding of DOP.
Confined and arbitrary code-execution. Further examination
of the gap between DOP and arbitrary code-execution may be
worthwhile. E. g., DOP may enable Turing-complete compu-
tation, but its results can not always be saved in a suitable
format to interact with the outside of the DOP bubble.
Multi-Stage Bootstrapping. Our prototype does not reason
about incomplete or constrained DOP gadgets, but instead re-
lies on the attacker to create definitions or recipes for sufficient
DOP gadgets. Similarly, the possibilities of executing multiple
DOP gadgets in one step, like the mov-add to implement
the store for Wireshark or the double-mov to implement
the store/load for ProFTPd, are yet to be fully explored.
An adaptive interactive mode, which uses info leaks to adapt
the sequence or content of following DOP gadgets would also
pose an interesting opportunity. If the search for DOP gadgets
would support such bootstrapping, we suspect that many more
applications would allow BYOSE-attacks.
Defenses. Concrete DOP attacks can be prevented in many
ways: Fixing underlying vulnerabilities, data layout ran-
domization, data obfuscation, or constrained read-/write-
targets [12], [50]. Since DOP is arguably even more complex
than ROP, there are likely even more subtle ways to hamper
attackers. However, it remains a challenge to create efficient,
easy-to-apply defenses, which constricts the very concept of
DOP and DOAs.
VIII. RELATED WORK
This section provides an overview over orthogonal attacks
threatening modern defense mechanisms, the state of the art
for data-only attacks, and defenses trying to prevent data-only
attacks.
A. Orthogonal Attacks
Counterfeit-object oriented programming (COOP) [56]
achieves ROP-like capabilities using only full-function gadgets
comprised of the methods of suitably crafted objects, without
violating the non-C++-specific Control-flow graph (CFG).
Crash Resistance [57] allows to probe memory, even though a
careless probe should crash the application. In combination
with a full-function reuse technique, this can thwart code
randomization and schemes for information hiding. Blind
ROP [30] uses a side-channel to locate gadgets in an otherwise
unknown binary with a stack-buffer vulnerability. This requires
that the attacked server-application is restarted after a crash,
without being rerandomized. Control-Flow Bending [58] is a
code-reuse attack that exploits the coarse-grained nature of
some CFI implementations. They chain pairs of calls to stan-
dard library functions such as memcpy/printf and control
their arguments to achieve Turing-complete computation on
the data plane.
Conti et al. [59] show that current CFI- and Shadow Stack-
implementations are vulnerable to attackers controlling stack-
values though a heap-based vulnerability. Go¨ktas et al. [52]
show that coarse-grained CFI does not prevent the execution of
call-site gadgets and entry-point gadgets. Control Jujutsu [60]
can circumvent even fine-grained CFI with a shadow stack,
because modern applications often use coding practices, which
exceed the limits of current pointer analysis. Snow et al. [61]
presented multiple attacks highlighting implementation pit-
falls of destructive code-read (DCR)-based defenses, whereas
BGDX [54] shows a more general attack deducing the location
of not-yet-protected gadgets.
Q [48] is conceptually similar to this work in that they
provide a language for exploit programming, too. The key
difference is that a) their language is more low-level than
SLANG, b) their languages is based on ROP gadgets, which
are much more regular across applications and easier to reuse.
The authors of Microgadgets [62] define classes of ROP
gadgets, and, trying to use those members with the fewest
bytes, implement higher-level operations. E. g., using multiple
xor-gadgets to implement a store, which is similar in
concept to our recipes, but without supporting the automatic
selection or recombination we achieve.
B. Data-Only Attacks
Chen et al. [11] have shown that attacking non-control-data
can have consequences just as severe as code-reuse attacks.
Memory Cartography [45] is an automatic way to create a
net of memory references to navigate reliably through data
structures, and can be used it to create data-only exploits
(DOE), which are robust to ASLR. Hu et al. presented a tech-
nique called dataflow stitching [22], which analyses potentially
corruptible data-flow in an application, especially with regard
on how to chain individual data-flows. However, their attacks
are targeted to enable specific attacks targeting the peculiarities
of a particular application, much in the spirit of Chen et al..
Based on these stitching techniques, however, they recently
developed what is now called DOP [20]. The authors not only
show that DOP often allows Turing-complete computation,
but also that DOP gadgets are frequently available. However,
they focus mainly on gadget search, and leave both the DOP
instance setup and the payload preparation to manual work.
Block-Oriented Programming [21] accepts a script in a
high-level language and a read/write-primitive as input. In a
nutshell, it then tries to solve the constraints a given program
has, to ultimately synthesize the script using data-oriented
techniques. It does so with a high degree of automation, but the
authors also show that their approach of program synthesis via
constraint solving is NP-hard. Thus, the synthesized programs
are rather simple, essentially only making sure that some
data ends up in a sensitive sink. We would argue that these
programs still belong to the step of DOP instance setup.
In contrast, this paper is mostly not concerned with DOP
gadget search, or the DOP instance setup, but instead focuses
on the payload preparation, which is automating the process of
creating the data structures that drive an application to execute
the many instructions of a DOP program.
C. Defenses against Data-Oriented Attacks
Current countermeasures against data-flow attacks seem to
mirror those against control-flow attacks. Lin et al. [19] and
SALADS [18] randomize the layout of data structures. Both
data-randomization [16] and Data Space Randomization [17]
masks data in-between uses by XOR-ing them with random
values. The authors of HARD [15] take this concept to the
hardware-level, with a customized RISC-V architecture. These
five techniques are based on introducing randomness, but may
not protect all data and furthermore require source code, which
makes them unsuitable for protecting commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) binaries. ValueGuard [14] inserts canary values in-
between buffers and other data to detect a buffer overflow.
Bhatkar et al. [63], shuffle functions, randomize heap object-
locations and location of the stack, and use separate stacks for
stack buffers. Both approaches significantly hamper DOAs, but
may not protect against such attacks in all cases (especially if
they are not based on buffer overflows).
Analogous to CFI, Data-flow integrity (DFI) [13] uses
a statically determined data-flow graph to restrict the data-
flow at runtime. Write-integrity testing (WIT) [12] analyses
a program to color instructions and memory objects. It then
ensures at runtime that instructions only write to objects with
a matching color. CUP [64] combines memory-maps with fat-
pointers to ensure spatial and (probabilistic) temporal memory
safety, even for stack-variables. HardScope [50] carries the
concept of a variable’s visibility-scope from the source code
to the runtime. These techniques incur high overhead, even
despite the fact that HardScope is implemented with hardware
support on an open-source microcontroller.
Exploits are naturally brittle, so we would expect most
defenses to thwart most unmodified DOP programs. In com-
parison to code-flow transfers, data is very dynamic and
touched virtually everywhere in a program, which makes it
hard to reason about and inefficient to check its integrity.
Thus, we expect that it will be even harder to create efficient
defenses, which prevent DOAs in principle rather than by
chance. E. g., the authors of HardScope acknowledge that
preventing the advanced exploit against GStreamer [51] that
we also use in our experiments is more challenging, because
it corrupts a heap object it could use legitimately as well.
Similar to CFI bypasses, some DOAs may fall through the
cracks, e. g., due to unprotected modules, false metadata, or
coarse class-granularity.
IX. CONCLUSION
In the last decade code-reuse defenses gained a lot of atten-
tion in academia and industry, which led to their wide-spread
adoption. However, the mitigations of the orthogonal DOA and
DOP attacks are still in the early stages of development.
In this paper we demonstrate that even constrained DOP in-
stances can be escalated in expressiveness to execute complex
DOP programs. We show that DOP programs aid in bypassing
code-reuse defenses to launch advanced code-reuse attacks
such as JIT-ROP. This BYOSE feature of DOP transfers
a whole class of just-in-time attacks to targets without a
built-in scripting engine. Our high-level SLANG language can
be used to implement portable DOP exploits and our DOP
compiler STEROIDS automatically constructs the required low-
level data structures to run them in target applications. We
hope that our results raise the awareness for DOA and DOP in
the research community and aid in the development of systems
defenses that consider the mitigation of these attacks.
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